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The Western Sahara conflict is getting old. Having turned 40, which is quite an advanced age 
for a conflict, it is increasingly showing signs of ageing–wrinkles, changes of shape, fatigue–
alongside its still apparent genetic inborn features. Protractedness seems to be ubiquitous in 
its usual portrayals: a late, zigzagging and protracted decolonization procedure that was 
reluctantly launched by dictatorial Spain in the 1970s degenerated into a protracted 
annexation of the territory by Morocco and a protracted conflict between the latter and the 
pro-Sahrawi independence Polisario Front, which in turn have entailed a protracted refugee 
situationi as well as a protracted conflict resolution process fruitlessly led by the international 
community for more than three decades. These efforts–which should more accurately be 
described as conflict management–have been epitomized by the United Nations (UN)’s 
Settlement Plan, which both Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted in 1991 along with a 
ceasefire declaration. Like the Oslo Peace Process for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this UN 
plan had the unfortunate fate of being “dismembered” “from comprehensive ‘agreement’ to a 
step-by-step process” (Mundy, this volume) and eventually failed to be implemented due to 
the parties’ insuperable disagreement regarding the electorate entitled to vote in the envisaged 
referendum for Sahrawi self-determination. After ill-advisedly attempting to find “technical 
solutions to resolve what were essentially political problems, which the [UN] Secretariat was 
unable or unwilling to address” (Theofilopoulou, this volume; Jensen, 2012), in the early 
2000s the UN put forward a series of “political solutions” combining a temporary autonomy 
formula (under Moroccan sovereignty) for the disputed territory and a referendum to 
determine its final status. Yet the so-called Baker Plans I and II, named after the UN 
Secretary-General’s personal envoy for Western Sahara James A. Baker III (1997-2004), also 
fell short of achieving the consent of both parties. The architecture of the UN peace brokering 
process virtually collapsed in 2007 when it became diluted into the new blurred approach of 
“negotiations without preconditions” (Theofilopoulou, 2010) which lasts until today. 
 This book examines the actual traces of the passage of time on the Western Sahara 
conflict. This means that it is more concerned with aspects of conflict perpetuation (“what 
keeps the conflict going now”) than with the primordial conflict formation (“what started this 
conflict in the first place”) (Mitchell, 2014: 27). An immediately arising question concerns 
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the conflict’s intractability. If intractable conflicts are simply defined as “those which, 
irrespective of what kind of parties are involved or the social environment in which they 
occur, continue for a long time and resist efforts to resolve them” (Mitchell, 2014: 60), then 
Western Sahara is definitely one of them. Three features concur in this regard: first, the 
original goal incompatibility between the parties is about a scarce material resource of a zero-
sum nature, i.e. territory and sovereignty (Joffé, 2010); second, this involves “goals and 
aspirations that are logically incompatible and nonsubstitutable”; and third, some of the latter 
goals have reached the point of “[concerning] the continued existence of one or both of the 
main adversaries” (Mitchell, 2014: 63). Paradoxically enough, this is one of those 
“intractable asymmetric conflicts” that are “actually highly symmetric, at least in the salience 
that the adversaries attribute to the issues in conflict, as well as in the value that they assign to 
achieving their own goals by winning” (Mitchell, 2014: 59). Moreover, its identity and 
existential dimensions appear to have gained prominence over time, which would have added 
a layer of incommensurability to the fundamental scarcity issue: “The battle for Western 
Sahara has rolled on, unresolved for over forty years, because it is that very nature/quality of 
being [being Sahrawi] that has come to be contested by many voices. The trouble with time is 
that new voices appear in the geographies of the argument, each seeking to write or over-
write themselves ‘within’ while the ‘original’ geographies fade from the record and memory” 
(Isidoros, this volume). 
 In any case, the focus of the book is not the never-ending debate on why this conflict 
has grown old behind the scenes, faced with the inadvertent neglect of the international 
community, but how specifically it has aged–ramifying on various scenes and geopolitical 
scales while conversely being impacted and shaped by developments on each of them. A 
second caveat is that the object of study are the tangible dynamics and effects of the conflict’s 
durability that can be observed in agents and structures at different levels of analysis, rather 
than ethical and normative debates such as the one sparked by Jeremy Waldron’s (1992) 
thesis on the supersession of historic injustices. At the same time, a shared concern of the 
authors of this volume is to make an effort at reflexivity, which can be defined as the 
“researchers’ (and policy makers’) awareness of their necessary connection to the research 
situation and hence their effects upon it” (Schierenbeck, 2015: 1030). 
 
A sparse and uneven academic literature 
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The origins of this collective volume on the global, regional, state/national and local 
dimensions of the Western Sahara conflict lie in an international seminar that was hosted by 
the universities of Granada and Jaen in October 2015, as well as a previous special issue 
published in 2013 by the Spanish Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas (Ojeda-
García and Veguilla, 2013). The initiative to organize the seminar and edit these publications 
arose from some dissatisfaction with the state of the art in the scholarly analysis of this 
conflict. With some noteworthy recent exceptions (Zunes and Mundy, 2010; Boukhars and 
Roussellier, 2013) and leaving aside highly valuable contributions from journalists (Hodges, 
1983; Bárbulo, 2002; Shelley, 2004), the academic literature dealing with this conflict has 
largely failed to do justice to all of its complexity and multidimensionality, as well as to make 
sense of the diachronic evolution entailed by its very longevity. This is to a significant extent 
the result of this literature being itself quantitatively limited and subject to a number of 
qualitative constraints and biases stemming from issues of sociology of knowledge. By and 
large, Western Sahara has long suffered from a marked lack of international interest at both 
political and academic levels. Its peripheral position discourages research on it as being 
marginal and hardly publishable in leading academic outlets even under the label of area 
studies. This has resulted in four observable trends in the available scholarship, namely: a 
disciplinary concentration in the areas of anthropology and international law, a widespread 
inclination towards exceptionalism in accounts of the conflict, the limitation of a large 
number of publications to Spanish-language audiences and the predominance of normative 
and legalistic approaches over empirical socio-political analyses. 
 In the first place, the observation of the academic marginality of the Western Sahara 
issue needs be qualified by distinguishing between disciplines. In actual fact, this conflict has 
enjoyed significant attention if not predilection in the field of international law, especially in 
Spain (Soroeta Liceras, 2014; Ponce de León, Arts and Pinto Leite, 2012; Ruiz Miguel, 
1995), and not least the study of Saharan tribalism and Sahrawi refugees are deemed to be 
even overcrowded by anthropologists (Caratini, 1989; Caratini, 2003; López Bargados, 2003; 
Naïmi, 2004; Naïmi, 2013; Campbell, 2010; Wilson, 2010; Wilson, 2014; Boulay, 2015; 
Boulay, 2016; Isidoros, 2015; Gimeno Martín, 2016).ii Anthropology and international law 
make an odd disciplinary couple, with each of them arguably standing at opposite ends of the 
continuum between the localized micro-level subjectivity of everyday human life and 
exogenous top-down legal objectification. Yet both have addressed the old and intricate 
question of who/what are the “Sahrawi” and somehow fed each other insofar as the 
international legal emphasis on Sahrawi “autochthony”–since the 1975 advisory opinion of 
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the International Court of Justice–has drawn on the anthropological concept of “kinship” 
(asaba) (Isidoros, this volume). An immediate remark is that there remains an essentially 
“political” gap to be bridged between anthropology and international law in analysing this 
conflict, all the more so if, as claimed by Konstantina Isidoros and Isaías Barreñada in this 
book, the major identity boundary currently demarcating who is viewed as a Sahrawi in the 
context of the Sahrawi nationalist camp lies in support for self-determination as a political 
project, “regardless of where they live and how it affects them” (Barreñada, this volume). 
 Secondly, the academic–just as the political–discussion of the Western Sahara conflict 
has tended to depict all phenomena surrounding it in quite particularistic terms. Assuredly, 
arguments in favour of the uniqueness or anomaly of this case are not in short supply. Chief 
among them are the cliché that describes Western Sahara as Africa’s “last colony” and the 
footnote that distinguishes it as the only odd territory on the UN list of non-self-governing 
territories that lacks an uncontested administering power–as Spain has purported to be 
exempt from any international responsibility in this regard since 1976.iii Similarly exceptional 
are the old-fashioned mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO), which lacks a human rights component unlike most of the UN peacekeeping 
operations of the post-Cold War era (Capella Soler, 2011; Khakee, 2014), and the European 
Union (EU)’s longstanding non-involvement and backseat role in this issue, which stands in 
stark contrast to its attempts to contribute to the resolution of other protracted conflicts in its 
southern and eastern neighbourhoods (Vaquer, 2004; Fernández-Molina, 2016). This is not to 
mention the widespread discourse on the uniqueness of Sahrawi refugees (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 
2014: 1-2) and the actual exceptionality of the Tindouf camps in terms of self-management 
and limited control by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (Fiddian-
Qasmiyeh, 2011: 9), which would add to the inherent “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005) 
or political and legal no man’s land that characterizes all refugee situations and refugee 
camps throughout the world. This being said, it is unclear whether the fixation with 
exceptionalism has benefitted our knowledge and understanding of the Western Sahara 
conflict, or has rather contributed to isolating its analysis from the wider literature in conflict 
studies, forced migration studies and many other disciplines. One of the contentions in this 
book is that more comparative studies would help overcome a somewhat blinding 
idiosyncratic bias.  
 Thirdly, the overall international academic neglect of this conflict, coupled with post-
colonial linkages and sympathy, has confined a significant part of the available publications 
within the limits of the Spanish language and Spanish-speaking audiences. The academic 
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literature in English, French and Arabic has been sparse and, most problematically, all of the 
linguistic clusters have often worked as hermetic compartments, with authors tending to read 
and reference works mainly in their own working language. Fourthly, due to the longstanding 
predominance of legal studies within Spanish social sciences as well as well-meaning 
normative concern about the injustices inflicted upon the Sahrawi people, the “Spanish bias” 
has come hand in hand with a legal and prescriptive bias in the study of the conflict. This 
would not be a problem itself if it were not for the gaps it has created over the years in the 
knowledge of (in David Hume’s terms) what is as opposed what ought to be in the context of 
this issue. Moreover, the ever-repeated argument that “the conflict of Western  Sahara  is a 
classic example of the conflict between the logic of power or realpolitik  and international  
law,  which  includes  the  right  to  self-determination” (Omar, 2008: 56) has crystallized in a 
neat dichotomy of international law vs. politics which does not reflect a far more complex 
reality. Among other things, as argued by Anna Theofilopoulou in this volume, “those who 
espouse the legal argument either ignore or are ignorant of how the settlement plan came into 
being, how it was negotiated and the geopolitical dynamics surrounding the conflict”. 
 In addition, besides the aforementioned factors relating to the sociology of 
knowledge, attempts to understand and explain what was/is effectively happening out there in 
the Western Sahara conflict have recurrently encountered the obstacle of the high 
politicization of conflicting accounts and narratives, including many academic analyses. 
Although the voluntary or involuntary involvement of scholars in the battlefield seems hardly 
exceptional in the field of conflict studies, in this case the lack of a critical mass of research 
and researchers increases the risk of “creating a vicious academic combat zone” (Isidoros, 
this volume). In connection to this, the researchers’ access to the field in the two main local 
scenes of the conflict–the Western Sahara territory annexed by Morocco and the Sahrawi 
refugee camps ruled by the Polisario Front near Tindouf, Algeria–has often been hampered 
by the corresponding governing authorities or shaped by reliance on specific networks of 
interlocutors. On the one hand, visits to the territory under Moroccan control and particularly 
to the capital El Ayun by most foreign observers remain carefully administered and 
ostensibly, intimidatingly watched by the Moroccan security services. This makes long-term 
fieldwork virtually “impossible” (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: xxxiii), subjects empirical 
research on the ground to a constraining semiclandestinity and limits the time scope to short 
stays under the permanent threat of expulsion. Contacts with the local population are equal 
parts marked by suspicion and eagerness to meet the stranger–especially by pro-
independence Sahrawi activists (Fernández-Molina, 2015a: 237), which might somewhat bias 
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the findings. A noteworthy exception in this regard is the extensive intermittent field research 
carried out by Victoria Veguilla in the Western Saharan city of Dakhla from 2001 to the 
present (Veguilla, 2011a). Constraints in this particular case were of a different kind: access 
to the field over the years was contingent upon not addressing every topic and not 
interviewing all the actors. On the other hand, the Tindouf refugee camps have traditionally 
been more open to outsiders, from NGO workers and activists to academics and journalists, 
yet priority has been granted to “practice-oriented, rather than research-oriented visits”. 
Justifiably or not, the issuing of official invitation letters from the Polisario Front required to 
obtain an Algerian visa has often been linked to assessments of the visitors’ actual or 
potential contribution to the “cause” of Sahrawi nationalism (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014: 34-
35). 
 One final bias that is admittedly present in this very book and deserves some 
unpacking is the “conflict bias” involved in construing and labelling the phenomena under 
study as a conflict. This assumption can be problematized particularly as one of the parties, 
Morocco, has always preferred to tone down the wording and talk about the “Sahara issue” or 
“question” (under the influence of the French language), thus trying to normalize the 
country’s long annexation of the disputed territory. Also, full-blown armed conflict or war 
has been objectively absent since at least the early 1990s both in both qualitative (ceasefire) 
and quantitative (level of battle-related fatalities) terms. Thus a relevant question arises: 
“What sort of a conflict do we have either when one party denies that a conflict actually 
exists or when both disagree over whether the issues have been properly defined or 
characterized? Who defines/decides whether there actually is a conflict? One of the parties? 
All of the parties? Third-party outsiders?” (Mitchell, 2014: 25). When it comes to empirical 
research, it can be at times appropriate and even more productive to analytically push the 
“conflict” framing into the background when studying some of the political dynamics 
occurring in Western Sahara–especially at the local level and in connection to the Moroccan 
governance of the territory.iv 
 All in all, this (self-)critical appraisal of the academic literature is not to diminish the 
significance of existing works on the Western Sahara conflict but quite the opposite. In spite 
of all of the aforementioned difficulties, four-five strands of scholarship have developed and 
settled in English, French and Spanish, each of them largely focusing on a different level of 
analysis. The first includes historical, military and journalistic accounts of the origins of the 
conflict. Most of these works underscore the conflict’s national and bilateral nature by 
depicting it as the result of Western Sahara’s unachieved decolonization and self-
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determination process as well as a confrontation for sovereignty between the Polisario Front 
and Morocco (López and de la Lama, 1975; Criado, 1977; Vilar, 1977; Gaudio, 1978; Villar, 
1982; Barbier, 1982; Hodges, 1983; Bontems, 1984; Lawless and Monahan, 1986; Diego 
Aguirre, 1988; Diego Aguirre, 1991; De Piniés, 1990; Pazzanita, 1994; Hernández Moreno, 
2001; Hernández Moreno, 2006; Bárbulo, 2002; Shelley, 2004; Barona Castañeda, 2004). 
Secondly, authors concerned with the global level of analysis have examined the involvement 
of the great powers and especially the United States (US) during the Cold War, post-Cold 
War and War on Terror eras (Zoubir and Volman, 1993; Zunes, 1998; Mundy, 2006; 
Darbouche and Zoubir, 2008; De Orellana, 2015), the vicissitudes of UN attempts at conflict 
resolution since the late 1980s (Zoubir and Pazzanita, 1995; De Froberville, 1996; De Saint-
Maurice, 2000; Dunbar, 2000; Mohsen-Finan, 2002; Callies de Salies, 2003; Pointier, 2004; 
Solà-Martín, 2007; Souaré, 2007; Jensen, 2012; Theofilopoulou, 2006; Theofilopoulou, 2007; 
Theofilopoulou, 2010; Theofilopoulou, 2013), the limited involvement of the EU throughout 
these decades (Vaquer, 2004; Benabdallah, 2009; Gillespie, 2010; Darbouche and Colombo, 
2011; Riquelme Cortado and Andrés Sáenz de Santa María, 2012; Smith, 2013; Torrejón 
Rodríguez, 2014; Fernández-Molina, 2016) and the increasingly politicized legal issue of 
Morocco’s international trading in Western Sahara’s natural resources (Shelley, 2006; 
Trasosmontes, 2014; White, 2015; Zunes, 2015). A third group of scholars has prioritized the 
regional dimension, discussing the extent to which this conflict has historically resulted from 
or been fuelled by competition between Morocco and Algeria for regional hegemony in the 
Maghreb (Damis, 1983; Berramdane, 1992; Mohsen-Finan, 1997; Zoubir and Benabdallah-
Gambier, 2004; International Crisis Group, 2007a; International Crisis Group, 2007b; 
Mundy, 2010; Martinez, 2011; Ammour, 2012) as well as its actual or potential connections 
with growing instability and security threats in the Sahara-Sahel area since the turn of the 
millennium (Mohsen-Finan, 2010; Wehrey and Boukhars, 2013).  
 Fourthly, more grounded research on socio-political developments witnessed in both 
the Moroccan-controlled territory and the Tindouf refugee camps has straddled between the 
state/national and local levels of analysis. This is particularly clear in the former case, where 
studies have addressed, on the one hand, the “carrots” and “sticks” of the Moroccan state’s 
governance of Western Sahara, that is, public policies, decentralization and autonomy 
initiatives (Veguilla, 2004; Veguilla, 2009a; Veguilla, 2011a; Veguilla, 2011b; Sater, 2008; 
Hernando de Larramendi, 2010; Desrues and Hernando de Larramendi, 2011; El-Maslouhi, 
2011; Khakee, 2011; López García, 2011; Vloeberghs, 2011; Theofilopoulou, 2012; Ottaway, 
2013) as well “settlement” policies, repression and human rights violations (Mundy, 2012; 
8 
 
Mundy and Zunes, 2015; Martín Beristain and González Hidalgo, 2012). On the other hand, a 
still budding literature focuses on Sahrawi youth, civil society, social movements, protests 
and nonviolent resistance (Stephan and Mundy, 2006; Brouksy, 2008a; Brouksy, 2008b; 
Brouksy, 2016; Veguilla, 2009b; Barreñada, 2012; Gómez Martín, 2012; Boukhars, 2012; 
Gimeno, 2013; Dann, 2014; Mundy and Zunes, 2014; Deubel, 2015; Fernández-Molina, 
2015a; Porges and Leuprecht, 2016). Meanwhile, the analytical distinction between the 
contested state/national level (Geldenhuys, 2009) embodied by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (RASD) and properly “local” or grassroots dynamics is more blurred when it comes 
to an exceptional spatial and political setting such as the Tindouf refugee camps. The number 
of publications showcasing fieldwork conducted there has not been scarce (San Martín, 2005; 
San Martín, 2010; Mundy, 2007a; Caratini, 2007a; Caratini, 2007b; Gómez Martín and Omet, 
2009; Wilson, 2010; Wilson, 2014; Campbell, 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2014). This 
literature links up with some significant contributions from the disciplines of refugee and 
forced migration studies (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Chatty and Crivello, 2005; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 
2009; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2010; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011a; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2011b; 
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2012) and migration and diaspora studies (Gómez Martín, 2011; Wilson, 
2014). In addition, these strands of literature are complemented by some insightful 
publications by geographers who emphasize the multiplaceness and moving socio-spatial 
borders of the Western Sahara conflict and its actors (Dedenis, 2006; Dedenis; 2011; 
Bennafla, 2013). 
On a different note, Moroccan scholarship on this issue has grown abundantly over 
the last two decades and can be divided into three categories which show dissimilar degrees 
of independence from official guidelines and discourse, namely: more sophisticated academic 
works that engage with the literature and theoretical debates in political science and 
international relations (Messari, 2001; Maghraoui, 2003; Daadaoui, 2008; Benmessaoud 
Tredano, 2011b; El-Maslouhi, 2011; Rahimi, 2014; El Houdaïgui, 2015); sociological and 
anthropological studies that make interesting empirical contributions but end up shoring up 
the official arguments on the conflict (Naïmi, 2004; Naïmi, 2013; Cherkaoui, 2007); and 
timely publications that explicitly follow and acclaim flagship Moroccan policies and chiefly 
the 2007 autonomy plan (El Ouali, 2007; El Ouali, 2010; El Ouali, 2012; El Messaoudi and 
Bouabid, 2008; Benmessaoud Tredano, 2011a) to the extent of arguably forming part of 
Morocco’s public diplomacy (Fernández-Molina, 2015b: 64). The bottom line is that, in spite 
of some academics pushing the limits of public debate on the “national question”, “the 
Moroccan equivalent of Israel’s ‘new historians’ have yet to emerge” (Mundy, 2014: 654). 
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Lost in conflict classifications 
 
Building on more multidimensional or multilayered studies such as those by Stephen Zunes 
and Jacob Mundy (2010) and Anouar Boukhars and Jacques Roussellier (2013), the intended 
contribution of this book lies in the first place in bringing together these four levels of 
analysis: global, regional, state/national and local. The aim is to contribute to disentangling 
the dynamic interplay between all of them or, in other words, examining change and 
continuity in the Western Sahara conflict through multilevel lenses. The time frame primarily 
addressed is the almost two decades elapsed since the turn of the millennium, when it can be 
argued that a gradual “spatial and scalar shift” or “inward turn” has brought the centre of 
gravity or locus of the conflict back inwards, to the interior of the disputed territory where it 
originated in the 1970s, and added new dimensions to it (Fernández-Molina, 2015b: 46-47). 
Such evolution can be described as dialectical change, as novelties have not led to a 
replacement of the original decolonization and sovereignty nature of the dispute but have 
resulted in growing complexity and contradictions. In terms of levels of analysis, the drivers 
of change appear to have been located mostly at the local level. While the situation within the 
diplomatic sphere and the internationally led conflict resolution process seemed to stall or 
freeze, dynamics occurring in the Western Sahara territory under Moroccan control became 
more and more prominent. Local protests and resistance by hitherto unnoticed “internal” 
Sahrawi pro-independence activists (based inside this disputed territory) quantitatively and 
qualitatively blossomed from 1999 onwards (Barreñada, 2012), achieving a considerable 
impact at both the global level and the Moroccan state/national level. In the context of the 
Sahrawi party or national movement considered in its entirety, this was to entail a gradual yet 
profound strategic reorientation from the old approach “based on armed struggle and 
diplomacy conducted by the Polisario, to one based on civilian-led nonviolent resistance led 
by Sahrawis living inside the occupied territory […]” (Stephan and Mundy, 2006: 2). In other 
words, change did not stem from the state/national level embodied by the RASD and the 
Polisario Front, but the latter understood the need to capitalize on it by recognizing the 
aforementioned activists and increasing contacts with them. 
 Furthermore, this “inward turn” of the conflict also represented an opportunity for the 
Sahrawi nationalists to recover some of their standing at the global level. It crystallised into 
new international strategies based on the combination of a “low politics” strategy (in terms of 
content) with parliamentary and judicial channels (in terms of means) (Fernández-Molina, 
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2016). This low politics strategy has focused on two secondary issues that were not central to 
the UN settlement plan but contribute to internationally questioning and delegitimizing the 
Moroccan annexation of the Western Sahara territory, that is Morocco’s human rights 
violations and the economic exploitation of the natural resources of Western Sahara. The 
main goal of the internationalization of the human rights issue has been to secure the 
extension of MINURSO’s mandate to human rights monitoring in both the disputed territory 
and the Tindouf refugee camps (Capella Soler, 2011; Khakee, 2014). While eventually never 
achieved, this demand became the main bone of contention in UN Security Council debates 
on Western Sahara from 2009 to 2015 and provoked unprecedented diplomatic crises 
between Morocco, on the one hand, and the UN and the US, on the other, in 2012-13 and 
2016 (Fernández-Molina, 2013; Theofilopoulou, 2016). However, some of the authors in this 
book consider that this Sahrawi approach has been ultimately ineffective: “While framing the 
problem of Western Sahara in the apolitical terms of human rights has won Western Saharan 
nationalists new sympathy and some diplomatic victories, it has failed to destabilize the 
fundamental geopolitical architecture underwriting the conflict” (Mundy, this volume). “This 
has only resulted in diverting the [UN Security] Council’s attention from its main task of 
pressing the parties to work on a solution to the conflict, without meeting the Polisario 
Front’s demand” (Theofilopoulou, this volume). 
 Meanwhile, the international questioning of the legality of Morocco’s trading in 
Western Sahara’s natural resources (fisheries, phosphate, oil) gained momentum after 2002 
following an opinion issued by UN legal counsel Hans Corell on contracts signed by 
Morocco and foreign companies to explore mineral resources in the territory (Boukhars and 
Roussellier, 2013: 244-245). The main target of this Sahrawi strategy has been the EU and its 
bilateral economic cooperation agreements with Morocco, all of which fail to differentiate 
between economic activities conducted in, and products originating from, Morocco proper 
and the Western Sahara territory. Some substantial achievements have been made in this 
regard through parliamentary channels–the European Parliament’s rejection of the protocol of 
extension of the 2006 EU-Morocco fisheries agreement in December 2011 (Smith, 2013)–and 
though judicial channels–the annulment by the Court of Justice of the EU of the EU-Morocco 
agricultural trade agreement (as far as its implementation in Western Sahara is concerned) in 
December 2015. These strategic shifts of the Sahrawi party demonstrate how changes of 
conflict dynamics at the local level have had significant effects on the global level, which 
have in turn sometimes contributed to reinforce the former following a circular logic. 
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 Coming back to the core of the conflict, it is also worth considering the extent and the 
implications of this “inward turn” and relative reframing of the agency and issues at stake 
between the parties. While it is widely acknowledged that a transformation has occurred in 
the “socio-spatial form of the conflict” (Bank and Van Heur, 2007), that is, in the way it is 
construed and constructed by actors from both sides as well as outsiders, the existence of 
more fundamental changes affecting the very nature or essence of the conflict remains 
unclear. Do these signs of internalization involve a de facto shift from what was once a 
typical decolonizing war of national liberation or an extra-systemic war to something more 
akin to an identity/secession conflict devoid of the armed confrontation component? While 
the former are defined by the conflict analysis literature as armed conflicts pitting a sovereign 
territorial state against a political entity displaying some state features but limited 
international recognition–in this case the RASD–the latter would be carried out by identity or 
communal groups, “often with the purpose of secession or separation from the state” (Holsti, 
1996: 21; Singer, 1996: 43, 47). In other words, in the second case the main dispute or goal 
incompatibility would revolve around “the relative status of communities or ‘communal 
groups’, however defined, in relation to the state”, including “struggles for access, for 
autonomy, for secession or for control” (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011: 76).  
 Curiously enough, a quick look at the most well-known international conflict 
databases in search of some comparative insights reinforces the idea that Western Sahara is 
somewhat lost in classifications. First of all, Western Sahara does not currently qualify as a 
war or armed conflict in any case, since it no longer meets the definitional requirements of 
sustained combat involving organized armed forces and resulting in a minimum of 1,000 
battle-related deaths per year (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). In addition, a serious discrepancy 
can be observed between Correlates of War, which categorizes this conflict as an “extra-state 
war” which lasted from 1975 to 1983, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace 
Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO) Armed Conflict Database, which considers it an “internal 
armed conflict” running from 1975 to 1989. For Correlates of War, the Western Sahara 
conflict was an “extra-state war” because it pitted a state or member of the inter-state system 
(Morocco) against the armed forces of a non-state entity outside the borders of the state 
(Polisario). It was also an “imperial war” rather than a “colonial war” as the relationship 
between the parties was not one of colonial power vs. colony. The outcome of the war in 
1983, when Morocco consolidated its military control over the annexed territory and the 
intensity of armed combat substantially decreased, was that the conflict continued at below-
war level of fatalities.v By contrast, the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset assumes that 
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Western Sahara was an “internal armed conflict” between the government of a state 
(Morocco) and an internal opposition group or “guerrilla organisation” (Polisario) without 
intervention from other states–except for one year, 1976, when it was an “internationalized 
internal armed conflict” due to Algeria’s overt involvement.vi The situation over the last three 
decades is summarized as follows: “As no activity reaching the level of an armed conflict has 
taken place since 1989, the conflict remains terminated as of that year. However, the basic 
incompatibility between the parties–the status of the territory of Western Sahara–remains 
unresolved”.vii 
 It is beyond doubt that the conceptual neatness of conflict classifications and 
databases is “less justifiable when one comes to deal with conflicts in the real world, which 
are invariably much messier than those that appear in the pages of books” (Mitchell, 2014: 
32). However, these inconsistencies about the nature of the Western Sahara conflict further 
illustrate that, beyond the letter of the law, the dilemma about it being international or 
internal is far from new. This is a sensitive line of reasoning since no classification or 
labelling is politically neutral. The political problem with describing Western Sahara as an 
identity/secession conflict is that it departs from the premises of international law, for which 
the original decolonization component of this dispute remains central, and it strikes a chord 
with Moroccan positions. On the other hand, this approach might be useful in analytical terms 
in order to better grasp the evolution of Moroccan governance of and socio-political 
dynamics in the Western Sahara territory. In any case, for some of the authors in this volume, 
these relative changes in the shape of the conflict are nothing but the inevitable effects of its 
very longevity and ageing. 
 
Levels of analysis are interconnected… and contested 
 
Another necessary caveat and point for discussion regarding the purpose of this book is that 
the scale and levels of analysis of the Western Sahara conflict are also a matter of contention. 
Any labelling the issue–as a decolonization/sovereignty dispute, a regional conflict or a 
peripheral Cold War East-West confrontation–is politically loaded and controversial. From 
the former two descriptions, placing the emphasis on the decolonization component is 
generally understood as stemming from an essentially “pro-Sahrawi” perspective, while 
giving prominence to the regional dimension–and Algeria’s involvement –has often 
(simplistically?) been read as a “pro-Moroccan” position which underrates and undermines 
Sahrawi agency. This politicization is in line with the increasingly generalized understanding 
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that, in conflicts like this, “geographic scale is no longer pre-given or simply a conceptual 
tool, but […] it is actively appropriated by social actors as part of their arguments and their 
practice in order to persuade others” (Bank and Van Heur, 2007: 595-596). In other words, it 
is possible to observe the “promotion of specific scalar imaginations at the expense of others” 
and dynamic transformations in the “socio-spatial form of the conflict”, which usually 
involve changes in the geometry of social power (Bank and Van Heur, 2007: 596-597). 
Besides the aforementioned “inward turn” of the Western Sahara conflict, the recent 
construction of a merging Maghreb-Sahel regional security complex (Martinez and Boserup, 
this volume) is a good example of this. 
 That being said, one of the central endeavours of this book in terms of levels of 
analysis is a call to localize the study of and research into the Western Sahara conflict. This is 
in line with the “local turn” that has become widespread over the last decade in the works of 
conflict and peace scholars and practitioners. The “local” has been rediscovered as a reaction 
to the shortcomings and failures of the top-down and one-size-fits-all toolbox of the post-
Cold War international liberal peacebuilding paradigm. The common denominator among the 
“local turn” advocates is an emphasis on the bottom-up potential for “peace from below,” as 
well as the need to recognize and empower local people as primary architects and owners of 
peace, as authors and not recipients in peacebuilding. On this basis, the “local” has been 
incorporated into both the mainstream problem-solving discourse of international 
institutions–which recommends enhancing local governance and ownership in order to 
increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of what are ultimately externally driven 
peacebuilding operations–and more critical or transformative analyses–which aim at genuine 
emancipation and inclusion of local agency (Leonardsson and Rudd, 2015). 
 The latter “critical localism” (Mac Ginty, 2015) propounds a reflexive and cautious 
use of what admittedly remains an unspecified, elusive and contested notion, and is in line 
with the scepticism about the “local” maintained by some of the authors in this book.viii The 
pitfalls of which academics and practitioners need to be aware include, in the first place, that 
of romanticizing, essentializing or homogenizing the “local”. Underrating or obscuring the 
fact that “local communities are often sites of heterogeneity, change, dissent and agency” 
(Mac Ginty, 2015: 847) amounts to a form of depoliticization: “To the extent that ‘the local’ 
is plural, dynamic and contested, it must also be political” (Hughes, Öjendal and 
Schierenbeck, 2015: 821). As a result, questions need to be raised as to: “Who controls 
wealth and power distribution locally? Who gets to decide what is local and what is not? Who 
speaks for local culture or local community? Who determines who is an outsider and who is 
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an insider?” (Hughes, Öjendal and Schierenbeck, 2015: 821). A second shortcut to be 
avoided is a static and binary understanding of the “local” as opposed to the “international” 
(Paffenholz, 2015; Kappler, 2015), which is far from reflecting any contemporary reality. As 
an alternative, some propose a sort of de-territorialization of the concept of the “local” by 
approaching it in terms of “activity, networks and relationships” (Mac Ginty, 2015) which cut 
across various levels of analysis. The challenge of empirical substantiation and accumulation 
is also key to deconstructing such false dichotomies. All in all, the conclusion of critical 
localists is that “the local does not offer a solution, but a range of opportunities to think 
differently about the relationship between power, agency and freedom” (Hughes, Öjendal and 
Schierenbeck, 2015: 818-819). 
 Some insights from this “local turn” approach seem suitable for a multilayered 
analysis of the Western Sahara conflict, which would counter the fact that it often continues 
to be discussed as a sort of delocalized issue. Much of the existing international law and 
normative literature conveys a “sense of placelessness” (Mac Ginty, 2015: 843), while usual 
accounts of international UN-led negotiations lead to a Cold War mindset in which 
peacemaking is depicted as a national and international affair, “a preserve of diplomats and 
state machinery” (Mac Ginty, 2015: 844). The “local” is notably absent. Of the 
aforementioned scholarly literature on this conflict, studies on local developments in the 
Tindouf refugee camps and the Moroccan-controlled territory remain by far the thinnest. It is 
also about the local level of analysis that international policy-makers know the least, as 
reminded by the UN Secretary-General in his 2012 report on Western Sahara: “[…] It [is] 
vital for the United Nations and the international community as a whole to have access to 
reliable, independent information on developments in both Western Sahara and the refugee 
camps in order to consider how best to promote a settlement.”ix  
 The main aim and common thread connecting the empirical contributions of the 
authors of this book is to provide a multilevel analysis of the Western Sahara conflict by 
examining issues and actors located on its concentric or overlapping global, regional, 
state/national and local scenes, and searching whenever possible for cross-level interactions. 
This analytical framework is reminiscent of the levels-of-analysis approach developed by 
Karl Cordell and Stefan Wolff (2009) for the study of ethnic conflicts. Cross-level 
interactions are broadly defined here as causality links of any kind between agents, structures, 
events or processes located at different levels of analysis. The subsequent chapters do not 
purport to be exhaustive in this regard; only a few of all of the possible cross-level 
interactions are addressed. 
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Table 0.1. Levels-of-analysis approach by Cordell and Wolff 
Level State structures and actors Non-state structures and actors 
Local/substate Local elites/leaders, authorities and 
representatives of the central 
government, established institutional 
arrangements and socio-economic 
structures 
Locally resident communities/ethnic 
groups/religious groups and their 
elites/leaders and locally operating 
NGOs, rebel forces, private-sector 
interest groups and criminals 
State/national National elites/leaders, central 
government, established institutional 
arrangements and socio-economic 
structures 
Communities/ethnic groups/religious 
groups and their elites/leaders and 
statewide-operating NGOs, rebel 
forces, private-sector interest groups 
and criminals 
Regional Neighbouring states and their 
institutions, regional powers, and 
regional international organizations, 
as well as their respective 
elites/leaders; established structures 
of political and economic 
cooperation 
Cross-border/transnational networks 
(ethnic, religious, civil society, 
business, organized crime, rebel 
groups, etc.) and their elites/leaders 
Global Powerful states and international 
organizations of global reach and 
their elites/leaders 
International NGOs, diaspora 
groups, international organized crime 
networks, and trans-national 
corporations, as well as their 
respective elites/leaders 
Source: Cordell and Wolff (2009: 10) 
 
In the first part of the book, and by way of introduction to the global level of analysis, Anna 
Theofilopoulou offers a practitioner’s perspective on the limitations of UN conflict resolution 
mechanisms within the straitjacket constituted by the great powers’ self-interested 
preferences and approaches. Jacob Mundy argues that the global structure of US hegemony 
has invariably shaped the Western Sahara conflict and the strategies of all the actors involved 
since the late Cold War until today. Responses to this global-level constraint include the 
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RASD’s efforts to showcase the “democratization” of the political structures in the Tindouf 
refugee camps and the new strategies of Sahrawi activism emphasizing nonviolent resistance 
and human rights issues in the territory controlled by Morocco. María Luisa Grande and 
Susana Ruiz highlight some of the particular features and inter-institutional inconsistencies 
observable in the EU’s inhibition and limited engagement with the Western Sahara issue, 
which appear to be quite exceptional in the context of the rise and fall of the EU’s ambitions 
about promoting security and preventing and solving conflicts in its neighbourhood.  
 The regional levels examined in the second part of the book are plural and comprise 
both the horizontal geopolitical scene of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), or Arab 
world, and the vertical scene consisting of a merging Maghreb-Sahel regional security 
complex, where Western Sahara and the Sahrawis seem to be some sort of missing link. 
Inmaculada Szmolka assesses the appropriateness and the implications of the Arab Spring 
regional framing imposed a posteriori on the Sahrawi protests that took place in Gdeim Izik, 
El Ayun, in October-November 2010, as well as the consequences of the reforms launched by 
the Moroccan state in 2011 as part of the “fifth wave of political change” in the MENA on 
both the Moroccan state/national and local level of the conflict. Laurence Thieux addresses 
the Maghreb, where the Western Sahara conflict has often been traditionally located by many 
scholars. She discusses the domestic and external determinants of the role of Algeria as 
Morocco’s rival in the competition for regional hegemony, as the lifeline for the Polisario 
Front and the host country for the Sahrawi refugee camps, and even as a full-blown party to 
the conflict for those who argue, in keeping with Rabat’s argument, that this is a 
fundamentally Algerian-Moroccan dispute. Luis Martinez and Rasmus Boserup analyse the 
reshaping of regional security and the growing prominence of the north-south Maghreb-Sahel 
axis in the eyes of the international community in the context of the War on Terror and the 
post-2011 instability. Miguel García Guindo and Alberto Bueno address the tricky situation 
and dilemmas facing the RASD/Polisario Front due to these new forms of securitization of 
the region. Moroccan diplomacy and propaganda have tried to seize the opportunity since the 
early 2000s by promoting a new securitizing discourse about the transnational terrorist and/or 
criminal connections (or potential risk thereof) of the Polisario Front, the “threat of 
ungoverned spaces” and the War on Terror’s framing of the Western Sahara conflict, thus 
“globalizing the local conflict against Polisario” (De Orellana, 2015: 489, 479). The terrorist 
kidnapping of foreign aid workers from the refugee camps in October 2011 was a particularly 
critical juncture for the Sahrawi leadership’s management of these cross-level interactions. 
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 The third part of the book is devoted to the state/national-level analysis of the 
Moroccan governance of the Western Sahara territory as well as its consequences at the local 
level. Raquel Ojeda-García and Ángela Suárez-Collado discuss the place and role of 
Morocco’s 2010-2011 Advanced Regionalization Reform in the context of this conflict, as an 
intended means to boost the legitimacy of–if not fully legalize–the annexation of Western 
Sahara and reinforce the credibility of the 2007 autonomy plan on both global and local 
levels. María Angustias Parejo and Laura Feliu disentangle the intricacies of the activities of 
the members of the Moroccan parliament representing Western Saharan constituencies in the 
sphere of parliamentary diplomacy and the way these global-level tasks interact with the 
changing identity substratum of the conflict, based on these MPs’ own identity self-
descriptions. Victoria Veguilla explains how Moroccan public policies towards Western 
Sahara such as elections and housing face the challenge of adjusting to the deep socio-
demographic transformations provoked by sustained northerner “immigration”–or 
“settlement”– in the territory while preserving local stability and formally living up to the 
international legal standards which privilege “autochthony” in the management of local 
resources.  
 Finally, the fourth part of the book offers the most grounded and localized insights 
about Saharawi resistance and identity in both the Western Sahara territory and the Tindouf 
camps. Claudia Barona and Joseph Dickens-Gavito provide a historical account of the 
development of Sahrawi civil society and protests in the territory annexed by Morocco. Isaías 
Barreñada discusses the transborder ethnic and identity dimension that has always underlain 
the conflict, overlapping–yet not full corresponding to–the territorial issue. His chapter sheds 
light on the scarcely explored grey zone of the nationalist activism of ethnic Sahrawis from 
southern Morocco who have mobilized hand in hand with their counterparts from the 
disputed territory despite falling outside the colonial territorial demarcation of Western 
Sahara and the electorate for an eventual self-determination referendum, all of which poses 
challenges for both the Moroccan state and the Sahrawi nationalist movement. 
Konstantina Isidoros explores the relationship between the extraordinary resilience of 
the Sahrawi refugee population and local understandings of “autochthony” and kinship, 
particularly by women refugees living in the Tindouf camps, also drawing contrasts with the 
exogenous and top-down categorizations of international law. Finally, Alice Wilson examines 
the particular features of the “work of elections” on which the Polisario Front and RASD 
leadership have expended considerable energy–in spite of the lack of multipartyism and free 
elections in the liberal democratic sense–as well as its effects at the Sahrawi state/national 
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level (forging a transterritorial “national” imagined political community encompassing the 
refugee camps, the Moroccan-controlled territory and the diaspora), the global level (enabling 
Sahrawi parliamentary diplomacy) and the local level  (creating “cultural and moral events” 
in the camps). 
 
Table 0.2. Cross-level interactions in the Western Sahara conflict 
 Agents/causes 
Local 
level 1: 
Western 
Sahara 
territory 
Local 
level 2: 
Tindouf 
refugee 
camps 
State/natio
nal level 
1: 
Morocco 
State/natio
nal level 
2: RASD 
Regional 
levels 
Global 
level 
Recipi
ents/ 
Conse
quenc
es 
Local 
level 1: 
Western 
Sahara 
territory 
 
 
 
X 
Family/ki
nship 
bonds, 
communic
ation and 
visits, 
civil 
society 
connectio
ns, 
defamatio
n of 
“returnees
” 
Moroccan 
governanc
e and 
public 
policies, 
socio-
economic 
investmen
ts, 
recognitio
n 
measures, 
settlement 
policies, 
repression 
and 
human 
rights 
violations 
Official 
support 
for 
“internal” 
pro-
independe
nce civil 
society 
organizati
ons, 
RASD 
Ministry 
for 
Occupied 
Zones, 
inclusion 
in 
Polisario 
General 
Congress 
and 
elections, 
RASD TV 
“Arab 
Spring” 
framing of 
“internal” 
Sahrawi 
protests 
Internatio
nal civil 
society 
and US 
human 
rights 
initiatives, 
visits by 
foreign 
observers/ 
supporters 
Local 
level 2: 
Tindouf 
refugee 
camps 
Family/ki
nship 
bonds, 
communic
ation and 
visits, 
civil 
society 
connectio
ns, official 
visits by 
“internal” 
 
 
 
X 
Internet 
and media 
propagand
a, 
encourage
ment of 
dissent 
and 
“return” 
State-like 
governanc
e of 
camps, 
administra
tion of 
foreign 
aid, 
elections, 
threats of 
a return to 
armed 
Algeria’s 
hosting 
and 
protection 
of refugee 
camps, 
impact of 
Maghreb-
Sahel 
security 
instability 
on 
EU/Europ
ean 
humanitari
an aid, 
limited 
role of 
UNHCR, 
support b 
internation
al civil 
society, 
foreign 
19 
 
Sahrawi 
activists to 
camps 
struggle securitizat
ion of 
camps, 
kidnappin
g of 
foreign 
aid 
workers 
visits to 
camps 
State/natio
nal level 
1: 
Morocco 
Participati
on in 
Moroccan 
institution
s, 
elections, 
parliament 
and 
consultati
ve 
councils, 
responses 
to 
Moroccan 
public 
policies 
and 
recognitio
n 
measures, 
socio-
economic 
and 
nationalist 
protests, 
instrument
al usages 
of 
Sahrawi 
identity 
  
X 
Diplomati
c 
interaction
/negotiatio
ns, 
internet 
and media 
propagand
a, threats 
of a return 
to armed 
struggle 
Escalation 
and de-
escalation 
of 
Algerian-
Moroccan 
tensions, 
oportuniti
es created 
by 
Maghreb-
Sahel 
security 
instability 
Expectatio
ns of 
Moroccan 
security 
cooperatio
n in War 
on Terror, 
post-Arab 
Spring 
expectatio
ns of 
political 
reform 
and 
liberalizati
on 
State/natio
nal level 
2: RASD 
Participati
on by 
“internal” 
activists in 
Polisario 
General 
Congress 
and 
elections 
Participati
on in 
RASD 
institution
s and 
elections, 
responses 
to RASD 
governanc
e of 
camps, 
protests 
Diplomati
c 
interaction
/negotiatio
ns, 
internet 
and media 
propagand
a 
 
 
X 
Algeria’s 
material 
and 
diplomatic 
backing 
for RASD 
Expectatio
ns of 
democrati
zation, 
prevention 
of 
radicalizat
ion/terrori
sm and 
accountabi
lity about 
the 
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and 
dissent, 
demands 
of a return 
to armed 
struggle 
administra
tion of 
humanitari
an aid 
Regional 
levels 
  Moroccan 
foreign 
policy 
activism 
and 
parallel 
diplomacy 
activism 
in Sahel 
Role of 
RASD/Pol
isario 
Front in 
regional 
security 
 
X 
US 
counterter
rorist 
policies in 
Sahel, 
internation
al military 
interventio
ns in 
Libya and 
Mali 
Global 
level 
Nonviolen
t 
resistance, 
“low 
politics” 
internation
al strategy 
(human 
rights and 
natural 
resources) 
Threats of 
a return to 
armed 
struggle 
Moroccan 
foreign 
policy, 
diplomatic 
crisis with 
UN, US, 
EU, etc., 
lobbying, 
parallel 
and public 
diplomacy
, 
propagand
a 
“Democra
tization” 
of RASD 
and 
elections, 
discourse 
on gender 
equality 
and 
religious 
freedom, 
“low 
politics” 
internation
al strategy 
(human 
rights and 
natural 
resources)
, 
parliament
ary and 
judicial 
strategies, 
threats of 
a return to 
armed 
struggle 
  
 
X 
Source: Author 
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